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ABSTRACT 
 
This research sought to determine how and if political polarization is affecting 
behavior on Facebook. An online survey was constructed to measure levels of 
polarization, offline political activity, online political activity, and active avoidance 
behaviors on Facebook. The survey was conducted over 4 weeks. I found that those who 
encounter a higher amount of political content and discussions on Facebook also reported 
a higher number of active avoidance behaviors over all. This group was also more likely 
to report unFriending someone because of something that Friend posted related to 
political or social issues. 
Those with a higher number of reported encounters with political content on 
Facebook reported a higher level of self-moderation as well, being more likely to delete 
one of their own posts when that post resulted in disagreeable or offensive comments 
from others. Those who reported greater frequency of political discussions on Facebook 
are more likely to delete comments from Friends that they find disagreeable or offensive 
on their own posts. 
The higher the intensity of ideology the more likely respondents were to discuss 
politics on Facebook and encounter or engage with political content on Facebook. Those 
with stronger political views were more likely to engage in political discussions and more 
likely to encounter political content on Facebook. Those with a higher level of perceived 
political knowledge were more likely to discuss politics and more likely to encounter 
political content on Facebook. 
 
viii 
 
Those with a higher intensity of ideology, stronger political views, and higher 
levels of perceived political knowledge discuss politics more frequently and engage in 
more political activities offline.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important aspects of a democracy is deliberation amongst citizens 
because it brings the electorate together in a shared process and creates a pool of 
knowledge, even if no consensus is reached. Deliberation increases the efficacy and 
political knowledge of citizens (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2009), resulting in a 
greater understanding of, and participation in, the political process. Exposure to a variety 
of political viewpoints and differing opinions creates a common ground for the electorate, 
which is an important foundation for the political discussion and debate that are essential 
for a democracy (Sunstein, 2007). Isolation from differing political perspectives can 
deepen the ideological divide in the electorate, resulting in a polarized population 
(Abramowitz, 2010b). This polarization leads to factions less willing to be governed by 
opposing factions or parties and less likely to compromise to reach a solution to societal 
problems (Mutz, 2011). Polarization results in a decrease in the shared experiences that 
foster solutions to societal problems in a heterogeneous society (Sunstein, 2007). 
In the last two decades, reports of the polarization of the American public have 
increased greatly, often blamed on technological advances. These technologies, 
particularly the Internet, and more recently social network sites (SNSs),
1
 allow people to 
seek out those with similar viewpoints and avoid those with conflicting opinions more 
easily than they might in offline encounters. The body of literature offers conflicting 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this thesis I will be using the definition of a social networks site provided by boyd and 
Ellison “as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public proﬁle within 
a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and 
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system” (2007). 
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reports on the validity and extremity of these claims. Like the printing press, radio, 
telephone, and other new communication technologies that came before it the Internet 
can be seen as a powerful tool that can be used to either foster or break down democracy. 
Almost as soon as the Internet came into public use came the fear that the Internet 
would lure users to the dark side – enticing them to read personalized news sources that 
only displayed stories and information that fit their personal interests and avoid 
information that conflicted with their interests or beliefs (Negroponte, 1995). The Internet 
lowers many of the barriers to connecting with like-minded individuals (Farrell, 2012; 
Valentino et al., 2009). The Internet allows the polarized electorate to actively avoid 
encounters and interactions with political perspectives that conflict with their own 
viewpoints (Buchstein, 1997; Hacker et al., 2006; Sunstein, 2007; Valentino et al., 2009; 
Witschge, 2004) and instead retreat into an echo chamber of homogeneous views, where 
they only encounter news and information that supports existing beliefs. As there is no 
definitive definition of echo chamber, in this thesis echo chamber refers to a group or 
network of people who share a similar political perspective and who share stories, news, 
and opinions that reinforce that perspective, while avoiding stories, news, and opinions 
that conflict with that perspective. 
Scholars, such as Sunstein, are concerned about the ability of Internet users to 
craft a Daily Me (2007), a personal online perspective in which the user only encounters 
news and information that match the user’s interests (Negroponte, 1995). This ability 
allows the polarized electorate to actively avoid exposure to different political 
perspectives (Sunstein, 2007). Research into the effects of the Internet on the political 
behavior of the American electorate has shifted focused over time to new and developing 
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communication resources. Initial research focused on email
2
 lists, later blogs
3
, and finally 
SNSs such as MySpace, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. Research on the latter is 
somewhat limited, but growing. Political behavior on Facebook can be difficult to study 
due to the closed nature of the site. While Facebook encourages users to Friend
4
 as many 
friends, lovers, coworkers, classmates, associates, and acquaintances as possible, it does 
allow users to limit the visibility of their activity in a number of ways so that it is outside 
of the public sphere as such. Because Facebook does encourage numerous and loose 
connections users are more likely to be exposed to the political viewpoints of their online 
connections than they might be in similar offline encounters (Horrigan et al., 2004). This 
creates the potential for greater discussion and exposure to a wider range of political 
perspectives. 
The same abilities of the Internet and SNSs that might expose users to a wider 
range of political perspectives also make it possible for users to seek out likeminded 
groups and actively limit exposure to conflicting political viewpoints. Those who are 
concerned about the possibly that SNSs, and Internet users in general, will use online 
services to limit their exposure to differing political perspectives and instead insulate 
themselves among likeminded people claim that this behavior hurts democracy for a 
number of reasons. First, lack of exposure to a variety of political views and discussion 
removes the common ground needed for appropriate political discussion and debate 
(Sunstein, 2007). This line of thought holds that deliberation and discussion are essential 
                                                 
2
  “A system for sending textual messages (with or without attached files) to one or more recipients via a 
computer network (esp. the Internet); a message or messages sent using this system.” (Email, n.d.) 
3
 “A frequently updated web site consisting of personal observations, excerpts from other sources, etc., 
typically run by a single person, and usually with hyperlinks to other sites; an online journal or diary” 
(Weblog, n.d.) 
4
 All of a user’s connections on Facebook are called Friends by Facebook. To differentiate this from the 
normal definition of a friend I will be capitalizing Friend when referring to Facebook connections 
throughout this thesis.  
 
4 
 
for a democracy. Second, the ability of SNS users to surround themselves with 
likeminded people will further polarization (Sunstein, 2007), making governing difficult 
as these partisan factions will be less likely to compromise and less likely to be governed 
by opposing factions (Barber & McCarty, 2013; Mutz, 2011). 
This study seeks to determine what, if any, measures Facebook users are taking to 
actively avoid differing political perspectives. Chapter 2 examines the existing literature 
on online polarization; who uses the Internet and SNSs and how these facilitate 
polarization, echo chambers, and active avoidance behavior; perceived political 
knowledge; and how Facebook is different from other SNSs. Chapter 3 details the 
methodology of the study. Chapter 4 examines the results of the study, and finally, 
chapter 5 discusses the findings, potential future research, and concludes this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This research seeks to determine if, and how, the polarization of the American 
electorate is affecting the behavior of Facebook users in such a way that allows 
individuals actively avoid differing political perspectives. This literature review surveys 
why polarization matters and what behavior we should be expect to observe because of it. 
It covers what we know about Internet use and access to establish who is using the 
Internet and SNSs and how these are being employed. This literature review explores 
how the Internet and SNSs facilitate polarization, echo chambers, and active avoidance 
behaviors. It also covers how the Facebook requirement that individuals use real names 
when creating an account creates an environment on Facebook that is different from other 
SNSs. 
 
Polarization of the Electorate 
 The American electorate is deeply divided ideologically on social and political 
issues, in other words polarized (Abramowitz, 2010b). There is some evidence that while 
the general public is not becoming more polarized those who self-identify with a specific 
party are becoming increasingly polarized (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Evans, 2003; 
Stroud 2011). According to Abramowitz and Saunders those who are politically engaged 
have always been more polarized than others (2008). Those who more strongly identify 
with a political party, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, display greater 
polarization than do those who are moderate (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Evans, 
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2003; Stroud, 2011). Specific topics such as abortion, sexuality, divorce, and school 
prayer show greater evidence of party polarization (Abramowitz, 2010; DiMaggio et al., 
1996; Evans, 2003; Harris et al., 2013). In these instances the party-line polarization 
might be seen as a reflection of the moral and religious stances the Democratic and 
Republican parties have taken on these issues over recent years (Evans 2003; Harris et al, 
2013). Issues such as immigration, the right of homosexual couples to be legally married, 
and women’s reproductive rights have entwined moral or ethical beliefs to political 
ideology, thereby furthering the degree of polarization. Research indicates that those who 
more strongly identify with a political party exhibit higher levels of polarized behavior 
offline (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Evans, 2003; Stroud, 2011) yet this has not been 
tested online without the veil of anonymity that many SNSs and Internet services offer. 
 Polarization is not just the sorting of the electorate into parties but rather is a deep 
ideological divide (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). This divide has increased overtime, 
each party has shown a substantial increase in the negative view of the opposing party 
since 1996 (Shaw, 2012). Polarized individuals are convinced not only that their 
perspectives are correct but that the perspectives of the opposition aren’t just wrong but 
inferior, illogical, and evil (Abramowitz, 2013; Brasted, 2012; Hacker et al., 2006; 
Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Mutz, 2006; Shaw, 2012). This vilification of those with 
a differing political perspective decreases the likelihood of deliberation and enforces echo 
chambers. This belief in the correctness of one’s political and policy views coupled with 
the belief in the inferiority and wrongness of opponents’ views produces a high level of 
subjective (or perceived) political knowledge. O’Cass reported that voters who report 
high levels of subjective, or perceived, political knowledge have higher levels of 
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confidence in their political views (2002). Therefore we would expect polarized 
individuals, who are confident in the correctness of their views, to report a higher 
perceived level of political knowledge (O’Cass, 2002; O’Cass & Pecotich, 2005). This 
thesis will examine self-reported perceived levels of political knowledge rather than 
objective knowledge as a measure of polarization. 
 
Online Polarization 
Efforts to determine the extent that the online political behavior of the American 
public demonstrates polarization have shown mixed results. In their study of political 
bloggers Adamic and Glance found that the liberal and conservative communities rarely 
interact with each other (2005). Liberal bloggers tended to link to liberal blogs and 
conservative bloggers link to conservative blogs (Adamic & Glance, 2005). SNS users 
who have stronger party ties and lean towards the more extreme end of their party 
affiliation are more likely to use SNSs for political purposes (Rainie, 2012). Blog readers 
seek out blogs to read that align with their current political beliefs (Lawrence et al., 
2010). When Twitter users who post tweets
5
 about a political issue with the same 
hashtag
6
 are mapped, they end up in two large, dense groups separated by ideology with 
little-to-no connection or interaction between the two groups (Smith et al., 2014). Figure 
1 depicts the Twitter map created by Pew of the #my2k hashtag created by the Obama 
Administration on November 28, 2012 in reference to the ongoing Congressional budget 
conflict (Smith et al, 2014). Two clearly distinct groups emerge with little interaction 
between them. It is also possible that those who interact across ideological lines or seek 
                                                 
5
 Posting a status update on Twitter, possibly containing images, video, or hyperlinks 
6“The # symbol, called a hashtag, is used to mark keywords or topics in a Tweet. It was created organically 
by Twitter users as a way to categorize messages.” (Using hashtags on Twitter, n.d.).  
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out differing political viewpoints do so not to learn, share, or engage in deliberation, but 
rather to insult and mock those they perceive as opponents. Research by boyd and Yardi 
indicates that even when there is interaction across ideological lines the intention is to 
provoke the opposite side rather than engage in deliberative debate (2010). 
   
 
Figure 1 “Two sets of groups using the #my2k hashtag over a two-day period in Jan 2013” (Smith et al., 2014) 
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10 
  
Some political scientists, such as Fiorina, argue that claims of an increasingly 
polarized American public are the production of media outlets and pundits who have 
vested interest in dynamic headlines (2005). The close elections of the last 15 years could 
be explained by a polarized America but polarization is not the only explanation. A close 
election could as easily be the result of a closely split, but not deeply divided public 
opinion (Fiorina, 2005). There are other possible explanations for the close races, after all 
as Mutz and Young (2011) point out, “complex findings do not cater to punchy 
headlines”(p. 1021). 
 While the potential exists for Internet users to limit their interactions to others 
who share similar political perspectives, the potential also exists for Internet users to 
encounter or to seek out those with differing viewpoints. Horrigan et al. found that 
Internet users had greater awareness of opposing viewpoints and a wider variety of 
political arguments than the general electorate (2004). In the 2004 survey 18% of 
respondents claimed that they prefer media sources that challenge their political views 
(Horrigan et al.). Instead of increasing polarization the Internet may actively be 
decreasing polarization by allowing users to gain greater exposure to a variety of political 
views (Kim, 2011). As with Internet access and use in general, those Internet users with 
higher education and income levels are more likely to be exposed to a wider range of 
political perspectives and arguments (Horrigan et al., 2004; Zickuhr, 2013). While 
exposure to a variety of political beliefs is important it is also important to examine the 
reaction when individuals encounter differing political perspectives, little has been done 
in this area. 
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 It may be that the very nature of SNSs exposes users to more diverse political 
views. The wide range of people in one’s Friends, and the Friends of Friends, offers a 
greater number of connections and possibilities for varying political perspectives. Users 
of SNSs are indirectly exposed to diverse political perspectives regardless of their 
partisan affiliation or political preferences (Kim, 2011). This exposure to diverse political 
perspectives happens regardless of whether individual users themselves share political 
content on SNSs (Kim, 2011; Rainie & Smith, 2012a; 2012b). It is this very nature of 
accidental exposure to political perspectives that requires further investigation. How do 
voters react when they encounter political perspectives that conflict with their own?  Do 
all individuals react the same way? 
 
Demographics and Use of the Internet and SNSs 
 Much of the theory and data on offline polarization has been applied to the online 
population; however, the online population is not necessarily reflective of the offline 
population. As of 2012 about 80% of the American electorate has access to and uses the 
Internet (Rainie & Smith, 2012a). It should be noted that Internet access and use falls 
along socio-economic lines. Internet access and use is more prevalent among whites, than 
among members of minority groups (Zickuhr, 2013). Higher education equates with 
higher Internet access and use, as does higher household income (Zickuhr, 2013). People 
65 and over as well as those in rural areas are much less likely to have access to, and use, 
the Internet (Zickuhr, 2013). In addition, not everyone who uses the Internet uses social 
network sites. From 2008 to 2012 the percentage of Internet users who use SNSs more 
than doubled, growing from 33% to 69% (Smith, 2013). 
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While Blacks are slightly less likely than Whites to use the Internet overall, they 
are more likely to say that SNSs are important to them for political purposes (Rainie & 
Smith, 2012b). SNS users ages 18-29 are also more likely to say that SNSs are important 
to them for political purposes (Rainie & Smith, 2012b). Only about 16% of SNS users 
say that they regularly post about political issues (Rainie & Smith, 2012b). At the time of 
the survey 10% of SNS users had recently posted about politics and 6% said that all or 
most of their activity was related to politics (Rainie & Smith, 2012b). The incidence of 
SNS users who Like
7
 or promote content related to politics is significantly higher (38%) 
(Rainie & Smith, 2012b), indicating that while people do not take initiative to seek out 
and share new content they are comfortable with liking and sharing content others have 
shared first. It is worth noting that the survey was conducted in the months leading up to 
the 2012 presidential election, which could lead to higher than average numbers of SNS 
users sharing and seeing political content. 
 
Social Network Sites and Political Content 
SNSs are unique in that they push news and information to users. Traditional 
online services such as newsgroups, blogs, news websites, and chat rooms rely on pull 
functionality. Users pull news and information to themselves by actively navigating to a 
website or subscribing to a newsletter or service to seek out differing political 
perspectives. In the case of SNSs, after logging in a user has news and information from 
                                                 
7
 Facebook users may click “like” under posts or comments made by others to indicate that they enjoy or 
agree with the content (Like, n.d.). These Likes then show up in the news feed of that user’s Friends. When 
referring to this action in this thesis I will capitalized Like to differentiate it from the normal use of the 
word like. 
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connections pushed to him or her requiring little to no effort on the part of the user to 
encounter a variety of political viewpoints from her or his contacts on that SNS. 
On one hand, SNS use may facilitate political discussion by providing a forum for 
discussion that does not jeopardize personal relationships (Kelly et al., 2005). On the 
other hand, the broad scope of the people included in one’s set of Facebook Friends may 
mean exposure to political viewpoints that might never be encountered through face-to-
face interactions. There is some evidence that even when users do seek out differing 
perspectives the limitations of online interactions – that is, lack of personal interaction – 
may restrict the positive outcomes of such encounters (Witschge, 2004). In theory the 
Internet allows users to engage in discussions free of the identifying characterizes that 
might otherwise prejudice others against them, allowing for more open-minded 
communication and exposure to ideas; however the majority of discussion is done by a 
minority of Internet users (Rainie et al., 2012; Witschge, 2004). 
 
Facebook and Political Content 
About half of adult Facebook users, or 30% of the U.S. electorate, are exposed to 
news stories on the SNS (Mitchell et al., 2013). News exposure on Facebook is important 
because the Facebook news feed
8
 exposes adults to news stories they might otherwise not 
encounter (Mitchell et al., 2013). Of those exposed to news stories while on Facebook, 
78% report other motives for visiting the site (Mitchell et al., 2013). This accidental 
exposure happens on Facebook in ways it would not while visiting other types of online 
services such as blogs, news sites, and newsgroups. Over half (55%) of the news stories 
                                                 
8
 The Facebook news feed is displayed as the central column of a user’s homepage and contains status 
updates, photos, videos, links, activity from applications, and Facebook activity from the user’s Friends, 
Pages, and Groups (How news feed works, n.d.) 
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adults encounter on Facebook are related to national government and politics (Mitchell et 
al., 2013), indicating that Facebook users are encountering political news on Facebook 
that they are not encountering anywhere else. In addition to inadvertent exposure to 
political content, 38% of SNS users report actively engaging in political activity such as 
“liking” or sharing political content, posting thoughts on political and social issues, or 
encouraging others to take action on political or social issues (Rainie et al., 2013). 
With the wide variety of Facebook Friends, Facebook users are often unaware of 
the political beliefs of their Friends until they see a politically related post from Friends, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be exposed to political perspectives that 
they were not expecting. Over half (58%) of adult Facebook users exposed to news on 
Facebook report being surprised by a Friend’s opinion about a news story (Mitchell et al., 
2013), which indicates that Facebook users were not made aware of these beliefs through 
other channels of communication. This also means that Facebook users are likely to be 
exposed to political perspectives that conflict with their own beliefs. Because of the 
nature of Facebook Friendships (coworkers, Friends of Friend, neighbors, classmates, 
etc.) it is probable that once users are aware of conflicting political perspectives of 
Friends they will choose to avoid the conflicting information, rather than unFriending and 
needing to deal with the fallout (Sibona, 2013). Facebook users are more likely to hide 
the updates that conflict with their political perspective, even if it means never 
commenting or seeing updates from that Friend, rather than deal with explaining to 
someone why they have been unFriended (Sibona, 2013). Facebook provides a unique 
opportunity to measure active avoidance behavior by requiring specific actions on the 
part of the user avoid to conflicting political perspectives that all individuals can employ 
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to retreat into their echo chambers. At this point no prior published research has 
attempted to measure this phenomenon. 
 
How Anonymity Affects Behavior 
There are hundreds of SNSs with different requirements and guidelines for users. 
Facebook has been selected for the purposes of this study because unlike many SNSs 
such as Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, Flickr, or Myspace, Facebook requires that 
individuals use their real names when creating a Facebook profile. The majority of the 
research has focused on Internet tools, such as Adamic and Glance’s 2005 and Lawrence 
et al.’s 2010 investigation of political blogs, as well as Harris et al.’s 2013 report on 
interaction in the comments of online news reports, that allow users to remain anonymous 
if they so choose. Pew’s recent research into politics and SNSs includes anonymous sites 
such as Twitter and Tumblr (Rainie & Smith, 2012a; 2012b; Smith, 2013; Smith et al., 
2014). There are both pros and cons of online anonymity. Without seeking to pass 
judgment or argue for or against anonymity, this thesis separates Facebook from other 
SNSs specifically because we do know that anonymity alters behavior and we cannot 
claim that anonymous and un-anonymous SNSs are equal. 
Research shows that people’s behavior changes when the Internet offers a cloak 
of invisibility through pseudonyms (Danzig, 2012) and provides a lack of accountability 
(Hatcher, 2009). If people feel they are anonymous, especially in a group, they are more 
likely to engage in what is perceived as socially unacceptable behavior (Nogami, 2009). 
The mask of anonymity offered by the Internet increases occurrences of defamation, 
libel, racism, hate speech, flaming, and trolling (Coffey, 2004; Lapidot-Lefher, 2012). 
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People will express bigotry, hatred, and prejudices, in ways that they would not without 
the anonymity offered by the Internet (Coffey, 2004). Additionally, when people see 
others act out in ways that would normally be considered socially unacceptable and suffer 
no real recourse, they often join in that behavior (Moore et al., 2012). Because the use of 
real names on Facebook increases civility in discussions (Halpern & Gibbs, 2012) it is 
expected that rather than engage with content with differing political perspectives, people 
will exhibit active avoidance behaviors that allow them to retreat into their echo 
chambers. 
  
 
17 
 
CHATPER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
  The purpose of this research is to investigate the political activity of the 
American electorate on Facebook. This research seeks to determine if, and how, political 
polarization affects active avoidance behavior on Facebook. If the electorate is actively 
avoiding differing political perspectives it is reasonable to expect to see specific 
avoidance behaviors in their Facebook use. Active avoidance behaviors involve 
respondents going out of their way to avoid exposure to items they would normally see in 
their Facebook news feed. Examples of active avoidance include hiding status updates 
from Facebook Friends, hiding the news feeds of Friends, unLiking
9
 Pages, unFriending 
Friends, deleting comments from Friends on their own posts that offer a differing 
political perspective, or even deleting the initial post that prompted the differing 
perspective comments. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 Because of the functionality of Facebook users are exposed to political news and 
information that conflicts with their political perspective (Kim, 2011; Rainie & Smith, 
2012a, 2012b). There are several ways Facebook users might be exposed to different 
political perspectives. Facebook users may see posts from Friends that include conflicting 
political perspectives. If the user herself posts content with a political message or policy 
views Friends may respond with comments on that post that offer a different perspective. 
                                                 
9
 When a Facebook user clicks “unlike” on a Page it removes the connection from that Page and stops 
stories from that Page from appearing in the user’s Facebook news feed.  
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A Facebook user may like
10
 a celebrity Page
11
 to see updates about upcoming projects 
and life events, but the celebrity may also share politically related updates. The 
polarization of the electorate and the tendency to retreat to echo chambers causes 
individuals to avoid political perspectives that conflict with their own. Facebook offers 
users several options to avoid seeing posts that offer conflicting political perspectives. 
 Facebook offers users a number of ways to actively avoid any, and all, of these 
exposures by hiding individual posts from Friends and Pages, hiding the news feed from 
a Friend, unFriending a Friend, unLiking a Page, deleting comments on her own posts, or 
deleting the original post. Each of these options requires an active decision from the 
Facebook user and that she click on a link and select the corresponding choice. This 
creates a series of active avoidance behaviors that can be measured. Due to political 
polarization and the preference for news and information that enforce existing beliefs I 
expect to see the following: 
H1: Those who identify as extremely liberal will report a higher number of active 
avoidance behaviors. 
H2: Those who identify as extremely conservative will report a higher number of 
active avoidance behaviors.  
H3: Those who feel strongly about their political views, whether liberal or 
conservative, will report a higher number of active avoidance behaviors.  
H4: Those who report a higher level of perceived political knowledge will report 
a higher number of active avoidance behaviors.  
                                                 
10
 When a Facebook user clicks “like” on a Facebook Page it connects the user to that Page. Stories from 
that page will appear in the user’s news feed (Like, n.d.). 
11
 Facebook allows business, organizations, brands, and personalities to create a Page that Facebook users 
can Like to receive updates from the Page in their news feed. For the purpose of the thesis I will be 
capitalizing Page when referring to a Facebook Page to differentiate it from a webpage in general 
 
19 
 
Data Collection 
Data were collected for this project by creating and dispersing an online survey 
using a Qualtrics account provided to Iowa State University faculty, staff, and students. 
Qualtrics is an online survey tool that allowed me to easily create and distribute my 
questions. Qualtrics allowed me to download the final data for further analysis. Qualtrics 
is secure; it passes SAS no. 70 requirements and meets the regulations of both the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 & the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (Academic Solutions, n.d.).  
I chose to use an online survey for several reasons. First, it allowed a greater 
number of responses to be collected in a shorter period of time. Second, it allowed users 
to answer questions anonymously and at their convenience. Third, because I am 
interested in online behavior, specifically Facebook, using online tools to disseminate and 
conduct the survey was likely result in more responses.  
 
De-Identification of Data 
 Data were collected using the Qualtrics online survey tool. This software did 
collect the IP addresses of respondents to prevent multiple responses from the same 
individual. However, as the IP data are of no use to this research, once the survey was 
complete and before analysis began all IP addresses were stripped from the data and each 
observation in the data set was assigned a random identification number.  
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Measurement 
 If people are actively isolating themselves from conflicting political perspectives I 
expect to see active avoidance behavior in the results. Active avoidance behaviors 
include unLiking Facebook Pages that post updates with conflicting political viewpoints. 
For example, a Facebook user may Like a celebrity or organization Page to see updates 
about upcoming projects or events. However, the Page may occasionally share politically 
related posts that do not align with the user’s personal views resulting in unliking the 
Page. Hiding the status updates, links, etc., hiding all of the updates from Friend with 
conflicting political perspectives, and unFriending Friends who share political 
perspectives that differ are all examples of avoidance behavior. I expect people to ignore 
or even delete comments on their own political postings that contradict their view points.  
 
Data Analysis 
To answer my research question of if and how political polarization affects active 
avoidance behavior on Facebook two pieces of data were needed. First, I needed a 
method to measure the level of polarization of respondents, and second, a method to 
measure active avoidance behavior was required. The data were not currently available, 
so I designed a survey instrument to measure these two factors as well as additional 
variables that may influence the outcome. 
Survey questions (Appendix) were structured in six parts. The initial section 
determined if the respondent was a U.S. citizen, over age 18, and had a Facebook 
account. Respondents who failed to meet any one of these criteria were thanked for their 
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time and exited the survey. Respondents who met all the criteria proceeded into the 
survey questions.  
The second section of questions measured the level of polarization of respondents 
using questions about party affiliation, conservative or liberal bias, strength of political 
views, and perceived knowledge on political and social issues. These questions served as 
independent variables. The three survey questions were:  
1. How liberal or conservative do you consider yourself? 1(extremely liberal) to 7 
(extremely conservative). 
2. On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the highest) how strongly do you feel about your 
political views? 
3. On a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the highest) how knowledgeable are you about 
political and social issues? 
 
The seven point scale for subjective or perceived political knowledge and for strength of 
political views is based on the work of Burton and Netemeyer (1992), Flynn and 
Goldsmith (1999), and O’Cass (2002). An additional independent variable was created by 
coding ideology based on the distance from moderate or middle of the road: 4 became 
zero, 3 and 5 became one, 2 and 6 became two, 1 and 7 became three. 
The third section of questions provided independent variables of offline political 
activity to determine a level of political engagement. If respondents are not active and 
engaged offline they would not necessarily be expected be engaged online and therefore 
not exhibit active avoidance behaviors.  
The fourth set of questions focused on Facebook political activity. These 
independent variables determined if respondents are politically active on Facebook, and if 
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and how respondents are interacting with differing political perspectives on Facebook. 
Questions determined if respondents Like Facebook Pages whose posts sometimes offer 
opposing political viewpoints, if respondents are Facebook Friends with people with 
opposing political view points, if those Friends and Pages share political content and how 
respondents interact with that contact. If respondents are not engaging with political 
content online I should not necessarily expect them to come into contact with opposing 
political behaviors that result in active avoidance behavior.  
The fifth series of questions was designed to determine if respondents are exhibiting 
active avoidance behaviors and provided the seven dependent variables used in analysis. 
Active avoidance behaviors were measured by six yes or no questions designed to 
determine if active avoidance behavior is happening. An additional variable was created 
by adding the total number of active avoidance behaviors for a range of 0-6 for a total of 
7 dependent variables. Active avoidance questions were: 
In the last 12 months have you: 
1. Hidden a post that you did not agree with from a friend about a political or social 
issue?  
2. Hidden all posts from a friend because you do not agree with the stories or 
opinions s/he posts about political or social issues? 
3. Unfriended a friend because you do not agree with the stories or opinions s/he 
posts about political or social issues? 
4. Unliked (unfollowed) a Page because of post about political or social issues that 
you do not agree with?  
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5. Deleted comments that you found offensive or disagreeable on something you 
posted?  
6. Deleted something you posted when it resulted in disagreeable or offensive 
comments from others? 
 
The final section of questions collected included demographic information such as 
gender, education level, year of birth, and annual household income. This section 
provided the final set of independent variables.  
The selection of questions was designed to answer the research question if and 
how polarization is affecting active avoidance behavior on Facebook. The questions also 
provide information as to whether Facebook political engagement follows offline patterns 
and online patterns in general. 
 
Sample 
This study used a convenience sample of my SNS contacts. While a convenience 
sample may not be representative of the population as a whole, this is a common 
methodology when studying SNSs (Chen, 2011; Chen & Marcus, 2012; Farrel & 
Dresner, 2008; Glynn et al., 2012; Lee & Ma, 2012; Macafee, 2013; Smock et al., 2011; 
Zhao et al., 2008). The survey was dispersed using my SNS accounts and email contacts. 
Twitter dispersion included tweeting a brief request
12
 to take the survey to my 
approximately 9,000 Twitter followers over the course of a 4 week period (December 15,
 
2013 through January 17, 2014). A similar format was used on Facebook, where I shared 
                                                 
12
 Twitter limits posts to 140 characters (Learn the basics, n.d.) 
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a link with a request to take the survey with approximately 500 Facebook Friends. 
Additionally I directly emailed approximately 25 contacts a request to take the survey. 
This offered exposure to the request through three different venues and allowed for the 
resharing
13
 of the request either through a retweet
14
, a Facebook share, or an email 
forward. Though a convenience sample, this methodology provided me the opportunity to 
examine polarization on Facebook 
 
Potential Weaknesses of the Data 
Internet Access and Use 
 This survey was distributed online. A portion of the U.S. electorate either lacks 
access to, or declines to use, the Internet. While an online survey may be reflective of 
Internet users it is not reflective of the U.S. population as a whole. In a 2012 report the 
Pew Research Center found that about 80% of the American adult public population has 
access to, and uses, the Internet (Raine & Smith, 2012a). It is also important to note that 
availability of Internet access and use falls along dimensions of race and class. Whites 
report higher access and use of the Internet, compared to members of ethic/racial 
minorities (Zickuhr, 2013). Both higher education level and higher household income 
level indicate higher probability of Internet access and use (Zickuhr, 2013). Senior 
citizens (age 65 and over) as well as those living in rural areas are significantly less likely 
to have access to, and use, the Internet (Zickuhr, 2013).  
It should be noted that of those who use the Internet not all use SNSs, although 
the ranks of SNS users are growing. The proportion of Internet users who use SNSs more 
                                                 
13
 Others to repost my initial request 
14
 The reposting of an initial tweet by other users on Twitter 
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than doubled from 2008 to 2012, increasing from 33% to 69% of Internet users (Smith, 
2013). Women are more likely than men to use SNSs (Rainie, 2012). However, since this 
research is intended to study online behavior, specifically on Facebook this is acceptable 
as long as it is not applied to the population as a whole.  
 
Profession of Respondents 
The majority of my Twitter followers and Facebook contacts work in the library 
profession. Because this is a convenience sample it may not accurately reflect the U.S. 
electorate as a whole. A 2013 report from the American Library Association (ALA) 
survey of its membership reports that 95% of the respondents hold a master’s degree or 
higher. According to a 2012 Pew Research Center report, 35% of college graduates self-
report as Democrats, while 27% lean Republican (Closer, 2012). Some reports indicate 
that those who have attended some graduate school have the lowest levels of exposure to 
political perspectives that differ from their own (Mutz, 2006). Women dominate the 
profession, only 19.3% of the ALA survey respondents were male (2013). According to 
Pew 40% of all women are Democratic while 27% are Republican (Closer, 2012). The 
ALA membership survey revealed that the vast majority of respondents (87.1%) identify 
as White (Closer, 2012) and according to 2012 Pew Research Center data Whites lean 
Republican nationally (34%) with only 28% identifying as Democrat. While the survey 
for this research was not based on a representative sample, the resulting data still allow 
for an examination of polarization on Facebook that can easily be replicated using a more 
representative sample later.  
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Facebook News Feed 
The final issue is the Facebook news feed itself. The homepage of Facebook for 
users is a news feed that displays the posts of Friends and Pages the user has Liked. The 
news feed is a running tally of the online activity of the user’s Friends and Pages. 
Facebook closely guards information regarding the algorithm that determines what items 
show up in a user’s news feed. The Facebook news feed is not a simple real time display 
of all of the activity of all of a user’s Facebook Friends and Pages. Instead Facebook uses 
a complex algorithm to determine what activity shows up in a user’s news feed. 
According to the Facebook website, “The News Feed algorithm uses several factors to 
determine top stories, including the number of comments, who posted the story, and what 
type of post it is (ex: photo, video, status update, etc.)” (How News, n.d.). According to 
Wagner (2013) only about 20% of the potential activity shows up in a Facebook user’s 
news feed. The news feed algorithm does take into account how often and how much a 
user has interacted with the activity of individual Friends in the past (Wagner, 2013). As 
a user interacts more with a Friend or Page, Facebook will automatically show the 
activity of that Friend or Page more often in the news feed. This could mean that users 
are Facebook Friends with people how hold differing political perspectives but they are 
not seeing that activity for a number of reasons including that they have not interacted 
with that user in the past. Survey questions attempted to determine how much exposure 
respondents have to differing political perspectives and this information will be 
accounted for in the analysis.  
This survey provides an initial exploration into active avoidance behavior on 
Facebook. This study could be duplicated later, with the intent to select a more 
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representative sample of the online population. This study moves past the theoretical 
aspects of polarization to determine if polarization and the electorate’s preferences of 
echo chambers that support their existing political perspectives is resulting in active 
behavior to avoid different political perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
RESULTS  
 
Distribution 
 To gather data for this analysis I created an online survey using Qualtrics. I posted 
links to the survey to my Twitter and Facebook accounts, and sent out emails to contacts 
over a 4 week period from December 15,
 
2013 through January 17, 2014.  
 
 
Figure 2 Initial tweet 
 
My initial tweet (Figure 2) was posted on Saturday, December 14, 2013 and 
received fourteen retweets. I posted a second tweet on Sunday, December 15, 2013 which 
received six retweets and one favorite
15
. On Monday, December 16, 2013, I posted a third 
tweet which received four tweets and two favorites. My final tweet was posted on 
Saturday, December 21, 2013, and received four retweets and two favorites. At the time 
of the postings I had approximately 9,000 Twitter followers; however, no effort was 
                                                 
15
 Twitter allows users to “favorite” the tweets of other users. A favorite is “represented by a small star icon 
next to a Tweet, are most commonly used when users like a Tweet. Favoriting a Tweet can let the original 
poster know that you liked their Tweet, or you can save the Tweet for later.” (Favoriting a tweet, n.d.) 
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made to determine how many of those accounts were active. There is also no way to 
determine how many people saw each Tweet or retweet. My initial post to Facebook was 
on December 14, 2013. and received shares by 15 people. At the time of posting I had 
approximately 450 Friends. There is no way to determine how many people saw my 
original post or the subsequent shares. I sent an email to 25 people with a link to the 
survey and text encouraging them to take the survey as well as share the survey with their 
family and friends.  
 
Sample 
The survey received 510 initial clicks, for a response rate of 18.58% based on the 
number of potential respondents. It is unlikely that all Twitter followers, Facebook 
friends, and email recipients saw the link to the survey, so it is challenging to calculate 
the precise response rate. There were 496 responses to Question 1, “Are you a U.S 
citizen?,” thirteen negative, and 483 affirmative. Question 2, “Are you 18 years of age or 
older?,” received 482 responses, all affirmative. The final qualification question, “Do you 
have a Facebook account?,” received 482 responses, two negative and 480 affirmative. 
Of the 480 people who moved past the qualifying questions, 445 answered all the 
questions through the six questions designed to measure active avoidance behavior and 
444 respondents answered all the survey questions. Data analysis was undertaken using 
the 444 complete responses to the survey.  
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Demographics 
Of the 444 responses 333 (75%) were female, 107 (24%) were male, and four 
(1%) responded “other” (Table 1). Respondents were heavily educated, with the majority 
(75%) holding a master’s degree or higher; 21 (5%) doctorate degree, 34 (8%) 
professional degree, 277 (62%) master’s degree, 72 (16%) bachelors degree, 19 (4%) 
high school diploma, and 1 never finished elementary school (Table 2).  
 
Table 1 Gender of respondents 
Male 107 24.00% 
Female 333 75.00% 
Other 4 1.00% 
 
Table 2 Highest education level achieved 
None (never finished elementary school) 1 0% 
Elementary school diploma 0 0% 
High school diploma or the equivalent (GED) 19 4% 
Associate degree 20 5% 
Bachelor's degree 72 16% 
Master's degree 277 62% 
Professional degree (MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, DD) 34 8% 
Doctorate degree 21 5% 
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The majority (80.18%) of respondents reported a household income of over 
$50,000 a year; 88 (19.82%) under $49,999, 44 (9.91%) $50,000 to $59,999, 20 (4.5%) 
$60,000 to $69,999, 36 (8.11%) $70,000 to $79,999, 40 (9.01%) $80,000 to $89,999, 38 
(8.56%) $90,000 to $99,999, 84 (18.92%) $100,000 to $149,999, 45 (10.14%) $150,000 
and over, and 49 (11.04%) preferred not to answer (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 Annual household income 
Less than $10,000 2 0.45% 
$10,000 to $19,999 7 1.58% 
$20,000 to $29,999 13 2.93% 
$30,000 to $39,999 20 4.50% 
$40,000 to $49,999 46 10.36% 
$50,000 to $59,999 44 9.91% 
$60,000 to $69,999 20 4.50% 
$70,000 to $79,999 36 8.11% 
$80,000 to $89,999 40 9.01% 
$90,000 to $99,999 38 8.56% 
$100,000 to $149,999 84 18.92% 
$150,000 and over 45 10.14% 
Prefer not to answer 49 11.04% 
 
  
 
32 
 
Politics 
 The majority of respondents reported being members of the Democratic Party: 
293 (66%) Democrat, 38 (8.6%) Republican, 70 (15.8%) Independent, 16 (3.6%) 
Libertarian, 16 (3.6%) Green, and 11 (2.5%) Other (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Party affiliation 
Democrat 293 66.0% 
Republican 38 8.6% 
Independent 70 15.8% 
Libertarian 16 3.6% 
Green 16 3.6% 
Other 11 2.5% 
 
 
Ideologically the respondents leaned liberal: 86 (19.4%) extremely liberal, 207 
(46.6%) liberal, 51 (11.5%) slightly liberal, 54 (12.2%) moderate, 19 (4.3%) slightly 
conservative, 26 (5.9%) conservative, and 1 (0.2%) extremely conservative (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3 Ideology 
1= extremely liberal, 7=extremely conservative,  
M=2.54 , SD=1.37 
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Of particular interest in regard to the level of polarization was the extremity or 
intensity of ideology, that is how far from the middle or moderate respondents reported 
their ideological position. An additional independent variable was created by recoding 
ideological responses based on the distance from moderate or middle of the road: 4 
became zero, 3 and 5 became one, 2 and 6 became two, 1 and 7 became three. This 
resulted in 54 (12.16%) middle of the road, 70 (15.77%) slightly ideological, 233 
(52.48%) moderately ideological, and 87 (19.59%) extremely ideological (Figure 4)  
 
 
Figure 4 Intensity of ideology 
M=1.8, SD=0.89 
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In addition to questions about party affiliation and ideology respondents were 
asked questions regarding the strength of their political and social beliefs. Respondents 
were asked to rate their level of political knowledge on a scale of one to seven to 
determine their perceived (subjective) level of knowledge on political and social issues. 
Overall respondents reported a high level of strength in their political beliefs, only 18.2% 
reported a moderate to weak level (Figure 5). On a one to seven scale, one being weak 
and seven being strong respondents reported: 102 (23%) seven, 157 (35.4%) six, 104 
(23.4%) five, 66 (12.9%) four, moderate or middle of the road, 6 (1.4%) three, 5 (1.4%) 
two, and 4 (0.9%) one, or weak (Figure 5). The mean was 5.57 with standard deviation of 
1.184.  
 
 
Figure 5 Strength of political views 
M=5.57, SD=1.184 
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Similarly, only 32% of respondents reported that their level of political 
knowledge (perceived knowledge) was moderate to low (Figure 6). On a seven point 
scale, seven meaning an expert and one meaning little-to-no political knowledge, 
respondents reported; 16 (3.6%) seven, 127 (28.6%) six, 159 (35.8%) five, 109 (24.5%) 
four or moderate, 24 (5.4%) three, 8 (1.8%) two, and 1 (0.2%) one or little to no 
knowledge (Figure 6). The mean was 4.94 with standard deviation of 1.04. Both results 
correspond with high levels of polarization; polarized individuals have more confidence 
in their beliefs and believe them strongly. 
 
 
Figure 6 Level of perceived political knowledge 
M=4.94, SD=1.04 
 
Active Avoidance Behaviors 
 The survey included six questions designed to measure active avoidance of 
differing political perspectives on Facebook in the previous 12 months (Table 5). The 
most commonly reported behavior (53.38%) was hiding a post from a Friend that the 
respondent did not agree with about social or political issues. Hiding all posts from a 
Friend because of status updates or stories shared that the respondent did not agree with 
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regarding a social or political issue was the second most commonly reported active 
avoidance behavior (48.87%). Almost a third of respondents (32.88%) reported engaging 
in the most extreme active avoidance behavior; unFriending someone because of the 
political stories or opinions that Friend had shared. 
 
Table 5 Active avoidance behaviors 
Questions 
In the past 12 months have you: 
Number of 
responses 
Percentage  
Hidden a post that you did not agree with from a friend 
about a political or social issue? 
237 53.38% 
Hidden all posts from a friend because you do not agree 
with the stories or opinions s/he posts about political or 
social issues? 
217 48.87% 
Unfriended a someone because you do not agree with the 
stories or opinions s/he posts about political or social 
issues? 
145 32.66% 
Unliked (unfollowed) a Page because of post about 
political or social issues that you do not agree with? 
146 32.88% 
Deleted comments that you found offensive or 
disagreeable on something you posted? 
83 18.69% 
Deleted something you posted when it resulted in 
disagreeable or offensive comments from others? 
60 13.51% 
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An additional dependent variable was created by calculating the total number of 
active avoidance behaviors for each respondent producing a 0-6 scale, 0 being no 
reported active avoidance behaviors in the last 12 months and 6 being an affirmative 
answer to all of the active avoidance behaviors in the last six months. Over three-fourths 
(76.13%) of respondents reported at least one active avoidance behavior, and over half 
(55.41%) reported two or more active avoidance behaviors (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 Total number of active avoidance behaviors reported 
M=2, SD=1.66 
Zero 106 23.87% 
One 92 20.72% 
Two 82 18.47% 
Three 72 16.22% 
Four 54 12.16% 
Five 28 6.31% 
Six 10 2.25% 
 
Analysis 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Test H1: Those who identify as extremely liberal will report a higher number of 
active avoidance behaviors and H2: Those who identify as extremely conservative will 
report a higher number of active avoidance behaviors. I first estimated analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) models with the total active avoidance behaviors against ideology 
and intensity of ideology separately, neither of which produced significant results. I then 
estimated multiple regressions models against each active avoidance behavior separately 
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as well as against the sum total of the behaviors. None of these results were significant, 
thus failing to support hypothesis one and hypothesis two. 
Intensity of ideology was significant in response to the question “In the last 12 
months have you deleted comments that you found offensive or disagreeable on 
something you posted?” The analysis showed statistical significance in the intensity of 
ideology, with the zero to three scale coding distance from moderate or middle of the 
road. The initial analysis indicated that moderates are more likely to delete comments 
made by others on their own posts (b=-0.072, SE=0.0288, p<0.05). The intensity of 
ideology was not significant in any other active avoidance behavior. It may be that 
moderates wish to avoid polarizing political discussion on Facebook and therefore delete 
any comments on their own posts that project that type of opinion or level of discussion. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
For H3: Those who feel strongly about their political views will report a higher 
number of active avoidance behaviors, strength of political views was not significant in 
the ANOVA or any of the multiple regressions, thereby failing to support hypothesis 
three. Additional analysis of the data indicates that those who feel strongly about their 
political views might be actively seeking out and engaging in political activity on 
Facebook, rather than avoiding it as first expected. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
To test H4: Those who report a higher level of perceived political knowledge will 
report a higher number of active avoidance behaviors, ANOVA and multiple regressions 
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models were again estimated (Table 7). The results did not show statistical significance 
for level of perceived political knowledge and thus did not support hypothesis four. As 
with the strength of political views, it may be that those with higher levels of perceived 
political knowledge are actively engaging in political actively and discussions on 
Facebook rather than avoiding differing political perspectives. 
40 
  
Table 7 Regression model results: Active avoidance behaviors 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.05 **p<01  ***p<.005  ****p<.001 
 
 Hidden a 
post 
Hidden 
news feed 
UnFriended 
someone 
Un-Liked a 
Page 
Deleted 
other’s 
comments  
Deleted own 
post 
Sum of 
avoidance 
behaviors 
Party -0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.063) 
Ideology -0.042 
(0.024) 
-0.044 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
-0.01 
(0.022) 
-0.033 
(0.019) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.133 
(0.8) 
Intensity of Ideology -0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.011 
(0.038) 
0.046 
(0.035) 
0.017 
(0.035) 
-0.071* 
(0.029) 
-0.036 
(0.026) 
-0.071 
(0.123) 
Strength of political views 0.037 
(0.0 29) 
0.052 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
-0.025 
(0.02) 
0.035 
(0.096) 
Perceived political 
knowledge 
-0.009 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.032 
(0.029) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.061 
(0.104) 
Frequency of political 
discussions on Facebook 
0.004 
(0.027) 
-0.031 
(0.028) 
-0.026 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
0.049)* 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
Engagement with political 
content on Facebook 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.012) 
0.04 
(0.012) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.107** 
(0.041) 
Frequency of offline 
political discussions  
-0.009 
(0.028) 
-0.03 
(0.028) 
-0.02 
(0.027) 
-0.008 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
-0.083 
(0.092) 
Offline engagement with 
political activities  
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.025**** 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.009) 
0.049 
(0.044) 
Gender 0.147*** 
(0.051) 
0.064 
(0.052) 
-0.036 
(0.049) 
0.04 
(0.048) 
-0.044 
(0.04) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
0.163 
(0.171) 
Age -0.001 
0.001 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
8.686 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-7.569 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
0.001 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Education -0.013 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.047* 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.108 
(0.082) 
Income 0.013 
0.008 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.026) 
4
0
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Additional Results 
 Analysis of the data yielded some significant findings that were not anticipated 
with the hypotheses. First, those who reported that they encounter a higher amount of 
political content and discussions on Facebook also reported a higher number of active 
avoidance behaviors over all (b= 0.113, SE=0.04, p<.005). This group was also more 
likely to report unFriending someone because of something that Friend posted related to 
political or social issues (b=0.025, SE=0.011, p<.005). Those with a higher number of 
reported encounters with political content on Facebook reported a higher level of self-
moderation as well, being more likely to delete one of their own posts when that post 
resulted in disagreeable or offensive comments from others (b=0.016, SE=0.008, p<.05). 
This group is also more likely to hide a single post from a Friend (b=0.013, SE=0.012, 
p<.05). While it is not surprising that those who encounter more political or social 
content on Facebook engage in more active avoidance behavior it is surprising to see 
unFriending, the most extreme of the active avoidance behaviors as well as the high 
levels of self-moderation or censoring. 
 Nine questions were designed to determine the level of engagement with, and 
exposure to, political content on Facebook (Table 8). More than half (56.31%) reported 
engaging in 6 or more political activities on Facebook ranging from Liking a Page that 
posts political or social content to posting links to political stories or commenting or 
Liking the posts of others about political or social issues. The vast majority (96.17%) 
reported engaging in at least one political or social activity on Facebook. 
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Table 8 Sum of types of political encounters and activities on Facebook 
M = 5.613, SD=2.794 
Zero 17 3.83% 
One 33 7.43% 
Two 33 7.43% 
Three 28 6.31% 
Four 44 9.91% 
Five 39 8.78% 
Six 46 10.36% 
Seven 40 9.01% 
Eight 86 19.37% 
Nine 78 17.57% 
 
Second, those who reported greater frequency of political discussions on 
Facebook (Table 9) are more likely to delete comments from Friends that are 
disagreeable or offensive on their own posts (b=0.053, SE=0.021, p<0.05). Over a third 
(38.74%) of respondents reported discussing political or social issues on Facebook once a 
month or more often. 
 
Table 9 Frequency of political and public affairs discussions Facebook 
M=1.363, SD=1.212 
Never 132 29.73% 
Less than once a month 140 31.53% 
At least once a month 72 16.22% 
At least once a week  79 17.79% 
Every day 21 4.73% 
 
 
 Because the data failed to support any of the four hypotheses I began looking for 
possible alternative explanations for the behavior of those with strong ideology, strong 
political views, and high levels of perceived political knowledge. It may be that people 
who exhibit these traits are actively seeking out and engaging with political content on 
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Facebook rather than avoiding it. Although no survey questions were designed to 
measure active political engagement with differing political perspectives on Facebook 
some questions were designed to measure frequency of political discussions and the 
likelihood that respondents encountered political discussions on Facebook. Regression 
models were estimated (Table 10) with these dependent variables against the three 
independent variables of intensity of ideology, perceived level of political knowledge, 
and strength of political views; all models produced significant results in all areas. The 
higher the intensity of ideology the more likely a respondent was to discuss politics on 
Facebook (b=0.387, SE=0.062, p<.0001) and the more likely the respondent was to 
encounter or engage with political content on Facebook (b=3.871, SE=0.98, p<.0001). 
Those with stronger political views were more likely to engage in political discussions on 
Facebook (b=0.483, SE=0.062, p<.0001) and more likely to encounter political content 
(b=0.483, SE=0.062, p<.0001). Finally, those with a higher level of perceived political 
knowledge were more likely to discuss politics (b=0.486, SE=0.05, p<.0001) and more 
likely to encounter political content on Facebook (b=1.1.74, SE=0.095, p<.0001). 
 
Table 10 Regression models results: Polarization variables by frequency of political 
and public affairs discussions Facebook 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis 
****p<.0001 
 Discuss politics on 
Facebook 
Encounter political content 
on Facebook 
Intensity of ideology 0.387**** 
(0.062) 
3.871**** 
(0.98) 
Strength of political views 0.483**** 
(0.043) 
1.258**** 
(0.095) 
Perceived political 
knowledge 
0.486**** 
(0.05) 
1.174**** 
(0.114) 
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 These findings indicate that rather than actively avoiding differing political 
perspectives polarized individuals, that is those with greater intensity of ideology, 
stronger political views, and higher levels of perceived political knowledge, are more 
likely to be exposed to and engage with political content. It may be that the high levels of 
confidence in their political views and the belief that their views are correct motivate the 
polarized to post more political content. They also associate with those who are polarized 
and so see more political content and discussion from their Facebook. Because of their 
strong beliefs and convictions rather than withdrawing from conflict the polarized engage 
with those who hold opposing political perspectives. It is possible that all of their 
political activities are happening within their echo chamber. Questions were not designed 
to determine if they were engaging with differing political perspectives. 
 I also examined responses to questions regarding offline political engagement. 
Over half (54.73%) of respondents reported discussing politics or public affairs either 
once a week or every day. Over three-fourths (77.48%) report discussing politics or 
public affair at least once a month or more frequently using offline methods. 
 
Table 11 How often do you discuss politics and public affairs with others in person, 
by phone call, or by letter? 
M=3.416, SD=1.036 
Never 14 3.15% 
Less than once a month 86 19.37% 
At least once a month 101 22.75% 
At least once a week 187 42.12% 
Every day 56 12.61% 
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Nine questions were borrowed from the Pew Internet & American Life Project to 
determine the level of offline political activity and engagement. All respondents reported 
engaging in at least one offline political activity, and just under half (47.52%) reported 
engaging in four or more activities (Table 12). 
 
Table 12 Sum of types of offline political activities and engagement 
M=3.712, SD=2.091 
 Zero 0 0.00% 
One 69 15.54% 
Two 82 18.47% 
Three 82 18.47% 
Four 67 15.09% 
Five 48 10.81% 
Six 46 10.36% 
Seven 23 5.18% 
Eight 19 4.28% 
Nine 8 1.80% 
 
 
Regression models were estimated with the three variables designed to measure 
polarization against the frequency of offline political activities and engagement, all three 
models produced significant results (Table 13). Those with a higher intensity of ideology 
discuss politics more frequently (b=0.206, SE=0.054, p<.0005) and engage in more 
political activities offline (b=0.4, SE=0.11, p<.0005). Those with stronger political views 
discuss political and social issues more frequently (b=0.607, SE=0.079, p<.0001) and 
engage in more political activities offline (b=0.391, SE=0.037, p<.0001). Similarly those 
who reported high levels of political knowledge (perceived political knowledge) engage 
in political discussions more often (b=0.462, SE=0.042, p<.0001) and participate in more 
political activities offline (b=0.832, SE=0.087, p<.0001).  
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Table 13 Regression model results: polarization with offline political encounters 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis 
***p<.0005 ****p<.0001 
 Discuss politics offline Engage in political activity  
offline  
Intensity of ideology 0.206*** 
(0.054) 
0.4*** 
(0.11) 
Strength of political views 0.608**** 
(0.079) 
0.391**** 
(0.037) 
Perceived political 
knowledge 
0.462**** 
(0.042) 
0.832**** 
(0.087) 
 
 
 These high levels of offline political discussion and engagement in political 
activity for those with intense ideology, strength of political views, and a high level of 
perceived political knowledge correspond with the levels of political discussions on the 
and engagement on Facebook. It appears that online activity and engagement are a 
reflection of offline activity and engagement (Table 14). Bivariate analysis of the 
frequency of political discussions on Facebook by offline political produced a coefficient 
of 0.513, standard error of 0.05, and p<.0001. Similarly the bivariate analysis of 
encounters of political discussions and content on Facebook by offline political 
engagement produced a coefficient of 0.605, standard error of 0.057, and p<.0001. Both 
results indicate a high correlation between offline political activity and discussion on the 
one hand and the frequency of political discussions and encounters of political content on 
Facebook on the other. 
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Table 14 Regression model results: Frequency of political discussions and 
engagement with political content on Facebook 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis 
*p<.05  ** p<.005 *** p<.0005 **** p<.0001 
 Frequency of 
political discussions 
on Facebook 
Engagement with 
political content on 
Facebook 
Party 0.035 
(0.038) 
0.012 
(0.085) 
Ideology -0.044 
(0.048) 
-0.202 
(0.107) 
Intensity of Ideology 0.103 
(0.075) 
0.104 
(0.165) 
Strength of political views 0.234**** 
(0.056) 
0.71**** 
(0.124) 
Perceived political knowledge 0.075 
(0.063) 
0.144 
(0.14) 
Frequency of offline political discussions 0.241**** 
(0.055) 
0.396*** 
(0.12) 
Engagement with offline political 
activities 
0.098*** 
(0.026) 
0.332**** 
0.058 
Gender -0.339** 
(0.103) 
-0.1 
(0.227) 
Age -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
Education -0.013 
(0.05) 
0.015 
(0.111) 
Income 0.001 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.034) 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study sought to determine if, and how, the polarization of the American 
electorate affects active avoidance behavior on Facebook. The loose and numerous social 
connections that Facebook encourages increases the likelihood that users will be exposed 
to political content that differs from their own perspectives and that they will be unaware 
of the political or social views of their Friend before encountering them on Facebook. 
Facebook’s unique platform allows for the study of a specific set of behaviors to avoid 
engaging with differing political perspectives. The data failed to support my four 
hypotheses however; there were interesting and significant findings. 
 
Discussion 
First, there was no indication that those with a greater ideological intensity, 
stronger political views, or higher levels of perceived political knowledge exhibit more or 
less active avoidance behaviors, compared to those with levels of these traits. Instead, the 
data show that, rather than avoiding differing political perspectives those with greater 
ideological intensity, strength of political views, or higher levels of perceived political 
knowledge may be seeking out political content or engaging with it when they encounter 
it. Those with greater ideological intensity, strength of political views, or higher levels of 
perceived political knowledge were more likely to discuss political and social issues on 
Facebook and to encounter content from others. All three of these variables are related to 
characteristics of polarization. It may be that the confidence and strength of conviction on 
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the correctness of their political views coupled with the belief in the ignorance or moral 
wrongness of those with differing political views motivates engagement. Polarized 
individuals may be motivated to attempt to educate those they believe to be less 
intelligent, correct those with low morals, or simply to mock those who hold a different 
set of political views. 
 
Limitations 
Based on the type of questions in the survey there is no way to know if the 
significantly higher levels of political discussions and encounters on Facebook for greater 
ideological intensity, strength of political views, or higher levels of perceived political 
knowledge indicate engagement with differing political perspectives. It may be that these 
discussions and encounters are with those with similar political views, which would 
support the echo chamber concerns of Sunstein and others. It may be that there is no 
importance in active avoidance behaviors by those with greater ideological intensity, 
strength of political views, or higher levels of perceived political knowledge because they 
are not encountering differing political perspectives, but rather engage in discussion and 
exchange of ideas and stories within their echo chambers. 
Because the data were collected from a convenience sample of my SNS contacts 
the demographics are not representative of the U.S. electorate. Respondents skewed 
liberal, and female, and were more heavily educated than the U.S. population as a whole. 
This may result in attenuated regression parameter estimates and thereby reduce the 
opportunity to detect statistically significant results. 
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 While the sample skewed female and liberal, the education and income levels are 
reflective of Internet users. Those with higher income and education levels are 
significantly more likely to be online (Zichuhr, 2013). Whites and Blacks are more likely 
to be online than other minority groups (Zichuhr, 2013). It should be noted that non-
whites, those with low income levels, and lower education levels are more likely to use a 
mobile phones as their primary or only Internet access point (Duggan & Smith, 2013). 
Some or all of the Facebook activities measured in these research questions are more 
difficult or not possible on mobile devices. 
 
Contribution 
The majority of the writing about polarization addresses the possibility for voters 
to isolate themselves with likeminded individuals, but does not explore if this is actually 
happening. Some research explores polarization and echo chambers by looking at 
comments on online news websites (Harris et al., 2013) or political blogs (Adamic & 
Glance, 2005) or Twitter interactions (Rainie & Smith, 2012a; 2012b; Smith, 2013; 
Smith et al., 2014; Yardi & boyd, 2010). This research examined at political behavior on 
Facebook. With the wide use of Facebook for a variety of purposes, including 
connections with classmates, family, friends, coworkers, and Friends of Friends, 
individuals were more likely to be exposed to a variety of political perspectives (Horrigan 
et al., 2004). Creating the potential for interactions and reactions that could be measured. 
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it focuses on 
political behavior related to SNSs specifically. The majority of the literature to date has 
focused on online services that pull users to the site or service. Blogs, online news sites, 
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and listservs require that Internet users actively seek out and engage with the content 
posted there. It is unlikely that accidental encounters of conflicting political perspectives 
will occur. Internet users who are likely to actively seek political perspectives that 
challenge their own views are more likely to be politically engaged in general (Lawrence 
et al., 2010) and are likely to have a higher than average interest in political issues 
(Horrigan et al., 2004). The push functionality of Facebook, pushing the activity of a 
user’s Facebook Friends into the news feed, creates the opportunity for accidental 
exposure to differing political perspectives as well as intentional exposure. Facebook 
pushes the status updates, links, likes, photos, and other shared content of Friends and 
Pages to users. This push technology makes it more likely that Facebook users will 
encounter differing political perspectives without actively seeking to do so (Horrigan et 
al., 2004). 
Second, this research focuses on SNSs – and specifically Facebook. People use 
different SNSs for different purposes (boyd & Ellison, 2008). Unlike the majority of 
other SNSs Facebook requires that individuals use their real names when creating a 
Facebook profile (Facebook’s Name Policy, n.d.). This removes the veil of anonymity 
from Facebook interactions, so that users’ political activity is done in full view of their 
Friends. This may result in different answers than those that are received to questions that 
ask about SNS in general. 
 
Potential Future Research 
 Future research could include an additional set of questions to determine levels of 
positive active engagement with differing political perspectives on Facebook, to 
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determine if participants are actively engaging with content of similar and differing 
political perspectives. Questions should attempt to determine the motivations for 
engagement as well as levels of engagement with similar and differing political and 
social views. It may be that engagement is intended to correct or mock the behavior of 
those with differing political perspectives. It also maybe that engagement is limited to 
positive interactions with homogenous perspectives resulting in an echo chamber effect. 
In that case engagement would not be considered productive deliberation. 
 The addition of variables intended to measure polarization would also be 
beneficial. Possible questions include asking respondents to rate the morality or 
intelligence of those with differing political views. This would address the claims of 
some that the electorate is not polarized just better sorted as well as provide additional 
measures for the levels of polarization. Finally, a sample that is more diverse and 
representative of the U.S. electorate as a whole would be beneficial. 
The correlation between online and offline behavior could be valuable in future 
research regarding the offline behavior of the polarized electorate. Concerns about the 
behavior of polarized individuals, especially the tendency to ensconce themselves in an 
echo chamber and surrounding themselves with likeminded individuals can be hard to 
measure offline. An individual’s choice to disengage with someone who holds and shares 
a differing perspective on political and social issues can be explained by circumstances 
not related to political or social issues. For example, lack of time, a new job, a new 
relationship, or relocation could be offered as a reason, and may well be believed by 
those affected. The Internet and social media provide a series of tools and specific 
behaviors that allow for the measurement of active avoidance as well as active 
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engagement behavior. Facebook requires specific behavior to actively avoid differing 
political perspectives. It also requires specific behavior to positively engage with 
homogenous social and political views, for example joining a Group, Liking a Page, 
Liking the status update of a Friend, or sharing content posted by others that you agree 
with. This active behavior could be measured using a series of questions designed to 
determine if individuals are engaging in political behavior on Facebook, if they are 
engaging with homogenous or heterogeneous political or social views, and the nature of 
that engagement. It is important to determine the nature of the engagement to be able to 
conclude if the interactions are reflective of deliberation including understanding and 
recognition of differing views, or rather if the engagement is intended to mock or 
antagonize those with differing views. 
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